PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ADMINISTRATORS.

With two judges dissenting the Supreme Court of Alabama holds in Jones v. Peables, 32 Southern, 6o, that the
administrators of an estate have not authority
Contracts
to enter into a contract to mortgage all the crops
grown on the estate to pay a mortgage on the land given by
their intestate and future advances to be made by the mortgagee to assist in raising the crops. Compare, as supporting in some measure the dissenting judges, Clark v. Knox,
7o Ala. 622, and Patapsco Guano Co. v. Ballard, 107 Ala.
710.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds in
Lyman v. National Bank of the Republic, 63 N. E. 923, that
Prior Acts of where an executor borrows money of a bank
:Executors
fqr the estate, and pledges stocks and bonds as
securty therefor, such securities cannot be iecovered back
by an administrator de bonis non without payment of the
loan. though the executor drew out the money on a check
payable to his own order, and appropriated it to his own
use.

ASSIGNMENTS.

Where a member of a partnership on being offered an
appointment to the public office of boiler inspector accepted.
Salary of
Publicfe

it under an agreement whereby the salary was
to go to the partnership, and such partner con-

tinued to draw living expenses from the partnership, such
agreement was not void, as ani assignment of an unearned
salary as a public officer, but was an agreement as to the
application of the salary when paid: Supreme Court of
Michigan in McGregor v. McGregor,90 N. W. 284. Compare Thurston v. Fairman, 9 Hun, 584, and Greenb. Pub.
Pol., 355: The distinction seems to be a very close one.
"
q8
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

In Jones v. Haines, go N. W. 518, the Supreme Court
of Iowa holds that where an attorney is employed on an
Compensation, understanding that he shall receive no compenContract
sation unless he obtains a favorable judgment,
and subsequently the client changes his plans as to the proposed course of procedure, such change is sufficient consideration to support an agreement whereby the attorney
is to receive in any event, the reasonable value of his services.
BANKIRUPTCY..

An assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, where the assignor ig adjudged bankrupt within
four months after the assignment, is not entitled
,General
Assignment,
to any allowance for his services in the care
Alow--e to and preservation of the property, since the asAssignee
signment, being an act in violation of the bankruptcy law, to which he was a party, he becomes merely the
agent of the bankrupt. But such assignee is entitled to an
allowance from the estate for the actual and necessary expenses incurred in preserving the property while in his pos-.
session, since such expenses would have been provable debts
of the estate had they been incurred as such by the bankrupt:
U. S. District Court (S. D. West Virginia), In re Mays,
114 Fed. 6oo.
BILLS AND NOTS.

In Tichenor.v. Owensboro Say. Bank, 68 S. W. 127, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that where the payor in
a note. executed for the price of land induced
another to buy the note by his representation
Estoppel
that he had no defence thereto, and that the note would be
paid when due, he is estopped, as against the assignee, to
plead a deficit in the land by way of set-off, though he was
not aware of the deficit when he made the representation:
See Billington v. McColpin (Ky.), 6o S. W. 923.
BROKERS.

When a broker was authorized to sell land for three dollars per. acre net to the owner, and was offered three dollars
Commissions and fifty cents by a purchaser, who subsequently
bought the land of the owner without the broker's intermediation, the broker could not recover fifty cents
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per acre from the purchaser, but his action was against the
owner, as it was his duty to sell for the best price obtainable,
and account to the owner therefor, less a reasonable compensation: Supreme Court of Arkansas in Boysen v. Robertson, 68 S. W. 243. Chief Justice Bunn dissents.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.

The dual relation of debtor and stockholder which frequently arises between building and loan associations and
investors gives rise to some interesting quesRights of
tions. Thus the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
Borrowing
Stockholder holds in Wills v. Paducah Building and Loan
Association, 67 S. W. 991, that a borrowing stockholder of
an insolvent building and loan association, which had made
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, was not entitled
to credit on her loan for the amount of dues paid on her
stock, though she had, before the assignment was made,
ceased to pay, and had filed suit seeking.to have all her payments applied to the discharge of her debts, as the association had been insolvent for some time before she quit paying, and had been endeavoring to wind up its affairs with a
See Reddick v. A~sociation's Asview to liquidation:
signee, 49 S. W. 1075. If the fact of insolvency is to be
made the test, numerous cases can be imagined in which it
will be difficult of application.

CARRIERS.

A. purchased a return trip ticket of the B. railway. The
ticket was in eight coupons, four for the outward and four
for the return trip, each containing a notice
Mistake of
Conductor
that it was void if detached from the signature
coupon. On the outward trip the first two conductors .tore
off coupons from the wrong end of the ticket. The third
conductor told A. of the mistake, and delivered to him the
coupons which should have been first taken, stating that
he could use them in place of those taken. On the return
trip the conductor refused to take the detached coupons and
on A.'s refusal to pay fare put him off the car. A 'c:
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the next car, paid the fare, forty cents, and rode to his destination. He then sued for breach of contract with aggravated damages. Under these facts the Supreme Court of
Michigan holds in Brown v. Rapid Ry. Co., go N. W. 29 o ,
that he was entitled to recover only the forty cents which he
was compelled to pay for the extra fare. No authority is
cited.
The Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Johnson v. Detroit Y. & A. A. Ry., go N. W. 274, that the rule relieving
Assault an
the master from liability for a malicious injury
Passenger
inflicted by his servant when not acting within
the scope of his employment does not apply between a common carrier of passengers and a passenger, since it is the
duty of the carrier to protect its passengers against injury
from the wilful misconduct of its servants while performing
the contract to carry. The duty of protection of passengers
owed by the common carrier has usually been illustrated in
the decisions in cases of female passengers. But the principle remains the same in the case of a male passenger and
it is here so applied.
-A., who had formerly been a railroad employe, when passengers were carried on all trains, purchased a ticket and
Construction was accepted by the conductor of a construction
Train
train, as a passenger thereon, which was against
the defendant's orders, except on official permit of which
A. had no notice. He knew nothing about the construction
train except that he had ridden thereon before as a. passenger, and that other passengers were on the train when he
took it. Construction trains were not on the defendant's
passenger time tables, but two other freight trains were, and
the train in question looked like an ordinary freight train,
except that it carried only a single car. Upon this case the
Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Spence v. Chicago R. L &
P. Ry. Co., 90 N. W. 346, that the conductor had such an
apparent .authority to accept A. as a passenger that such
acceptance made him a passenger, and as such he could
recover for injuries caused by the defendant's negligence:
Compar6 Shoemaker v. Kingsbury, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 369,
where the United States Supreme Court reaches a different
conclusion on similar, but not identical, facts.
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CODS PLBADING.

The difficulties aising -from the desire to consolidate
actions under the code system, and the tendency of the
courts to lean towards methods of the older
Petition,
practice, are constantly appearing in the cases.
Distinct
A new example is presented in Grentner v. FehTheory
renschield, 68 Pac. 619, where the Supreme Court of Kansas
holds that the plaintiff must frame his petition upon a distinct and definite theory, and upon that theory the facts
alleged must state a good cause of action. If the petition
is not drawn upon a single and definite theory, or there is
such a confusion of theories alleged that the court cannot
determine from the general scope of the petition upon which
of several theories a recovery is sought, it is insufficient.
Compare Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, 30
Wis. 624.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

A stipulation in a contract for the carriage of a horse, limiting liability in case of injury from the negligence of the
of Lyf I"-

carrier to $ioo, is held o in Hughes v. PennsylvaniaR. Co., 51 Atl. 99 , by the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania, to be against the policy of the
by
Carie
state so as not to be enforceable when the injury
occurs within the state, though the contract-is made outside
the state, for carriage from a point without to a point
within it by connecting carriers.
It is further held that the interstate commerce act, the
object of which is to secure continuous passage and uniform
rates, and to compel the furnishing of equal facilities, is not
violated by holding a contract- for carriage from a point
without the state to a point within it invalid, so far as concerns points within the state, in its stipulation limiting the
carrier's- liability in case of injury from negligence. Two
judges dissent from the opinion of the court.

CONNECTING CARRIERS.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds, in Jacobs v. Third Ave. R. Co., 75 N. Y.
E ection of
Supp. 679, that a street railway company is liable
Passenger
for ejecting a person who presents -a transfer
ticket from a connecting road, not acceptable

"nrlo-

"

-
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of the company because not properly punched, though the
mistake was made by an employe of a connecting road, there
being a traffic agreement between the two roads, whereby
transfers were issued from one to the other. The ground
of the decision is that, under the traffic agreement between
the two railroads, each conductor acted as agent of the
respective railroads in issuing transfer tickets for carriage
thereon. See Minor v. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 363; Talcott
v. Railroad Co., 89 Hun, 492.'

CONSTITUTIONAI,

LAW.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Lowe v.
SeaboardAir Line Ry. Co., 41 S. E. 297, that a statute providing that a common carrier shall pay a penInterstate

alty Of $500 for shipping freight by a route
other than that designated by the shipper, is unconstitutional
when applied to goods shipped from a foreign state, as in
violation of the interstate commerce section of the Federal
Constitution.
Commerce

The Tennessee Code provides that in non-resident attachment proceedings, based on attachment of property and serAttachment vice by publication, "when the property attached
against
is not sufficient to satisfy the recovery, execution
Nonresidents may issue for the residue as in other cases." In
Kemper-Thomas Paper Co. v. Shyer, 67 S. W. 856, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, considering this provision,
holds that in so far as it attempts to authorize a personal
judgment and an. execution against a non-served, nonappearing, non-resident for any amount whatever after the
appropriation of his impounded property, it is repugnant
to the due process of law clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution. Two judges dissent.
In Wilson v. Iserninger, 22 S. C. R. 573, the United
States Supreme Court holds that no unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of a contract is made by
Obligation
o
- the provision of the Pennsylvania act, April 27,
Cotracts
1855, § 7, conclusively presuming a release and
extinguishment of any irredeemable ground rent on which
no payment or demand for payment has been made for
twenty-one years, and of whose existence no acknowledg-
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ment has been made during that period, even though such
provision is applicable to a ground rent reserved before the
passage of the act, as the further provision that "this section
shall not go into effect until three years from the passage
of this act," gave a reasonable time to the owners of such
ground rents for preserving their rights.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds, in Porterv.
Charleston & S. Ry. Co., 41 S. E. io8, that a statute providing a penalty on common carriers for failure
Damages
to
to pay or refusal to pay damages on freight
Frelght
within sixty days is not in violation of the Federal constitution as denying to the carrier the equal protection of the laws, nor is it unconstitutional as in conflict
with the interstate commerce clause of the constitution.
CONTRACTS.

Where a contract of employment of an actor provided
for its termination at any time on two weeks' notice by the
employer, on an arbitrary discharge on five
Damages
days' notice by telegram, the damages under the
contract could not be more than the two weeks' salary:
City Court of New York (General Term) in Dallas v.
Murry, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1040.

See Watson v. Russell, 149

N. Y. 388.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds, in Collister v. Hayman, 75 N. Y. Supp.
Transfer1102, that if theatre tickets are mere personal
ability
licenses, given by the proprietor to the purchaser to enter and witness the- performance, as it is said
the weight of authority indicates, they are not salable or
transferable by the purchaser, notwithstanding he has a
municipal license therefore.
Where a husband agreed with his wife, in consideration
of the discharge by her of a mortgage on his property, that
he would not change, alter or revoke a will thereMaking wi,
Specific
tofore made by hih, leaving all his property to
Performance

her, and after performance by her made a new

will, leaving the property in trust to his executor, to pay the
income to her for'life, and then convey to another, on such
last will being probated, such agreement should be-enforced
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CONTRACTS (Continued).

in equity, by requiring the legal title to be conveyed -to her:
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) in Kine v. Farrell,75 N. Y. Supp. 542.
In Caldwell v. Frazier,68 Pac. 1076, the Supreme Court
of Kansas holds that an option contract to purchase is but
a continuing offer to sell, and conveys no inOption,
terest in the property, and that when such a
Specific
Performance

contract is accepted it takes effect from the date

of acceptance, and bihds the grantee only to a conveyance
of the property in its present condition. If, it is said, intervening the offer and acceptance, the improvements thereon
are destroyed by fire, equity will not decree a specific performance of the contract with the improvements restored,
or with an abatement in price equal to the lost improvements;
See Bras v.Sheffeld, 49 Kans. 702.

CORPORATIONS.

In Pitman v. Chicago Lead Co., 67 S.W. 946, the Court
of Appeals of Kansas City holds that where the directors of
Preferenceto

Director,

an insolvent corporation conveyed property to
one of its members in payment of an alleged cor-

porate debt such director has the burden of provfroof
ing the good faith of the transaction, and that he
did not vote for such proposition nor improperly influence
his associates to do so; and a showing that the debt was
genuine, and that the preference was made by a quorum of
the directors without the vote of such director is insufficient.
In Missouri it is well settled that an insolvent corporation
may prefer its creditors, but the degree of proof sufficient to
uphold such a preference in favor of a director is settled by
this case: Compare State v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co.,
149 Mo. 181.
Burden of

A secret contract between a corporation and certain stockholders that, at the end of two years, the corporation will
Contracts

repurchase their stock at a IO per cent advance,

is void as to creditors of the corporation, the
capital stock being a trust fund for the benefit
of creditors; and such stockholders are not entitled to file
a claim against the corporation for the amount of such
repurchase price in proceedings to wind up the affairs of
the corporation: Supreme Court of Illinois in Olmstead v.
with
Stockholders ,
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Vance & Jones Co., 63 N. E. 634. See, in connection with
this case, Clapp v. Petersonj 104 Ill. 26; Bank v. Burch., 141
Ill 519.
DIMDS.

A vendor of realty, having secured the cash payments and
notes for the purchase price, executed a deed which he
retained, in order that his wife who was ill at
Delivery,
statute of
the time, might subsequently sign it.
The
Frauds
vendee went into possession, and the vendor
assumed that he had title to the notes. The Supreme Court
of Tennessee holds, under these facts, that no title passed
because there was no delivery of the deed, and that the deed
could not be regarded as a memorandum satisfying the statute of frauds, and entitling the vendee to specific performance: Wilson v. Winters, 67 S. W. 8oo. The court regards
such a memorandum as incomplete without delivery. Compare an apparent exception to this view in Bowles v. Woodson, 6 Grat. 78.

EVIDENCE.

It is frequently said that statements made in the presence
of a person accused of a crime charging him with the commission of it, if uncontradicted by him, are adcrimina
Law,
missible in evidence against him. This almost
Admissions seems like manufacturing testimony, for on the
other hand, if he voluntarily answers, his replies would be
evidence. In People v. Young, 76 N. Y. Supp. 275, the
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First Department) takes a somewhat different view from that ordinarily suggested and holds that evidence that after defendant's arrest a statement of a third person connecting him
with the murder was read to him, and that he said nothing,
is not admissible against him as an admission; the officer
in charge cautioning him that he was not required to speak,
as anything he said might be used against him, and telling
him that the statement was to inform him of the nature of
the evidence against him. The attending circumstances
make the actual .decision somewhat weak, but the policy of
the general rule may be questioned: See People v. Kennedy,
164 N. Y. 449.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
BVIDBNCE

(Continued).

In Meyer v. Brown, 90 N. W. 285, the Supreme Court
of Michigan holds that on the question of weight of wood
shipped by the plaintiff to the defendant, books
Entries in
Books
of the railroad in which are copied in the regular
course of business the weights of cars, from the cards on
which the weights are first entered under the supervision of
the weighmaster, he comparing the entries in the books with
the cards, after which the cards are destroyed, are competent,
the weighmaster being called to authenticate them: See
Lassone v. Railroad Co. (N. H.), 24 Atl. 9o2.
In Iowa following the policy of some of the states an
illegitimate is allowed to inherit from the father in case he
has recognized it either publicly and notoriously
Illegitimate
Children
or in writing (Code § 3385). In applying this
provision of the Code the Supreme Court holds in Britt v.
Hall, go N. W. 34o, that declarations by a deceased parent
recognizing an illegitimate child are admissible as declarations against interest in an action by the child against the
father's executor to be allowed to inherit; but declarations
denying paternity are not admissible.
In an action for slander, words spoken at different times
before suit brought, though not declared on, may be given
in evidence to show the intent with which the
slandr
words declared on were spoken; but words
spoken after suit brought cannot be given in evidence, for
they may be the ground of another action: Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia in Swindell v. Harper,41 S. E.
117. See Moigan v. Livingston, 2 Rich. 573, and Howell
v. Cheatham, Cooke, 247.
The Supreme Court of Arizona holds, in Qualey v. Territory, 68 Pac. 546, that where the court below erred in
Impeachment sustaining an objection to a question seeking
of
to lay the foundation for impeachment of the
Witness
witness by evidence of prior conversations of the
witness, such error is harmless and not ground for reversal,
when it is not followed by an offer to establish such conversations. -"Were this cause reversed and a new. trial granted
for the reason assigned, there is no showing in the record
indicating that the witness would or could be impeached in
the manner indicated by the question excluded by the court."
Compare Snead v. Tiet]en, 24 Pac. 324.
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In an action against a municipal corporation for injuries
from a defective sidewalk, statements by- an ex-councilman
Sttements as to what knowledge he had of the defect while
by an
a member of the city council, were not admisEx-OMidal

sible, as he could not bind the city after the

termination of his term: Supreme Court of Oregon in
Adkins v. City of Monmouth, 68 Pac. 737.

FIXTURES.

In Schellenberg v. Detroit Heating and Lighting Co.,
90 N. W. 47, the Supreme Court of Michigan holds that,

where machinery is purchased by a husband
under a contract, that title is to remain in the
Realty
seller till paid for, and it is installed by the seller
at the request of the husband on real estate held in the name
of the husband and wife, the want of unity of title to the
machinery and ownership of the land prevents the machinery
from becoming a part of the realty, and it may be removed
by the seller.
Title

to

INFANTS.

Attorneys who have represented a minor in litigation
are entitled to a lien on his recovery for a reasonable comCompensation

pensation:

Supreme Court of Tennessee in

American Lead Pencil Co. v. Davis, 67 S. W.
864. But they cannot have the amount of their fees fixed
on an ex parte application to the court.
of Attorney

INJUNCTIONS.

In PhiladelphiaBall Club v. Lajoie, 51 Atl. 973, a case
of considerable newspaper notoriety, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania holds thata contract of employrhatrailty
ment of a ball player for a season, giving the
employer a right of renewal of the contract for three succeeding seasons, by notice given before the close of each
current season, and providing for termination of the contract on ten days' notice, and providing that the employe
may be enjoined from playing for another during the continuance of the contract, these provisions being declared
part of the consideration for the agreement to pay-the stipu-
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lated salary, is not lacking in mutuality of remedy, or so
unreasonable as to prevent the issuance of an injunction, the
contract having been partly pei-formed and the employer
being desirous of its continuance.
In general the court holds that, to authorize an injunction
restraining an employe from rendering services for another
contrary to his contract of employment, it is necessary that
they be of such a unique character; and display such a special
knowledge, skill and ability, as to render them of peculiar
value to the employer and difficult of substitution.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds, in State v. Cairns,
68 Pac. 621, that the agent of an express company, who in
good faith delivers to the assignee, or upon his
Delivery
by
order, goods carried by his principal, consigned
Express
C. 0. D., and collects the charges thereon, is
Company
not guilty of selling intoxicating liquors to the
purchaser, or his order, though he has reason to believe or
knows the goods so consigned and delivered to be ihitoxicating liquors. In such case, it is held, it is the consignor who
delivers the intoxicating liquor to the carrier upon an order
from the consignee that makes the sale, and the sale is made
at the place of delivery to the common carrier. The important bearing of this decision upon the question of the relation of the carrier to traffic which the state seeks to control
is obvious. See also Cont. v. Fleming, 130 Pa. 138, and
State v. Flanagan,38 W. Va. 53, 17 S. E. 792.

JUDGME NT.

In Cahnmannv. MefropolitanSt. Ry. Co. 75 N. Y. Supp.
970, the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Term) holds
Res
that where a firm recovered a judgment against
Judicata
a street railroad company for damdges to the
firm's horse and wagon, caused by the negligence of the
street railroad company, and the question of the company's
negligence and the contributory negligence of one of the
firm, who was driving the team, .had been litigated in that
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action, the judgment rendered therein in favor of the firm
is admissible in the driver's favor, in an action brought by
him alone to recover for personal injuries received. Compare House v. Lockwood, 137 N. Y. 259, and authorities

there cited.

LIEAS.

The Surrogate's Court of Kings County, New York,
holds, In re Henshaw, 75 N. Y. Supp. io47, that a covenant
covenants
of Lessor

of a lessor to buy, at the termination of the lease,
the buildings remaining on the premises, is per-

sonal to the lessor, and (foes not run with the land nor. bind
heirs or legaties, Compare Tallman v. Coffin, 4 N. Y. 134.
The court says: "The general theory of contracts of character similar to this is that, where there is no specific provision making it a covenant running with the land, then it
can be admitted as a personal covenant only.

LIMITATIONS.

In Farm Inv. Co. v. 'Wyoming College and Normal
School, 68 Pac. 561, the Supreme Court of Wyoming holds
c Uateral

that a creditor responsible for the loss of col-

lateral security notes by the bar of the statute
of limitations is chargeable with the value
thereof as of the date of the bar, and not of the date of the
collateral's maturity, as had the notes been collected after
maturity, the date of. collection would be the date of credit
to the principal debtor.
security

Notes

MECHANIC'S LIEN.

The City Court of New York (Trial Term) holds, in
Berger Mfg. Co. v. Zabriskie, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1038, that
Liability of
a provision in a lease that the tenants shall make
Landlord
all repairs, etc., is not. such a consent on the part
of the landlord that a third party shall furnish labor and
materials as to give the latter a mechanic's lien therefor,
especially in the absence of any notice or knowledge on the
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The difficulty in developing a standard of due care in
negligence cases appears in San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v.
Contributory Gray, 67 S. W. 763, where the court is conNegligence
fronted with the question of how far danger to
human life will render an act not negligent which is generally held to be so. The Supreme Court of Texas there holds
that, where the plaintiff was injured while running on a railroad track to rescue his child, who was in danger of being
run down by an approaching train, the fact that he was
wrongfully on the track when he discovered his child's
peril does not make him a trespasser in his subsequent efforts
to save his child; nor was it under such circumstances contributory negligence for him to run back along the track
towards the train in an effort to save the child. See Spooner
v. Railroad Co., 115 N. Y. 22; Becker v. Railway Co., 61
S. W. 997.
PROXIMATE CAUSE.

In Watson v. Dilts, 89 N. W. io68, the Supreme Court
of Iowa holds that recovery may be had for nervotis prostration from fright, caused by the defendant's
Nevous
Prostration trespassing, by stealthily entering, in the nighttime, plaintiff's home; this being a physical injury, and in
the view of the court, the proximate result of the wrong.
Some of the cases bearing upon this question will be found
reviewed in Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401. See, also, note
in Ewing v. Railway Co. (Pa.), 14 L. R. A. 666.
RENT.

In Shell v. West, 41 S. E. 65, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina holds that an executor renting devised land
Action by
can recover the rents, notwithstanding the claim
Executor
of the devisee, on showing that the rents are
required to pay the testator's debts. See Moore v. Shields,
68 N. C. 332.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

In Talbot v. Sioux National Bank, 22 S. C. R. 621, the
United States Supreme Court holds that a petition which
shows on its face that the action was not comPleading
menced within the statutory period, may be met
by a demurrer, and the statute of limitations need not be set
up in an answer or plea.
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SUBMERGfNC"

OF LAND.

In Hughes v. Birney's Heirs, 32 Southern, 30, the Su-*
preme Court of Louisiana holds that if, after submergence,
ReapPearc,,
Ownership

the water disappears, from the land either by

gradual retirement or by the elevation of the
land by natural or artificial means, and its identity can be
established by reasonable marks or by situation, extent,
quantity or boundary lines, the proprietorship remains in
the original owner. And it is said: "No lapse of time during which the submergence has continued bars the right of
the owner to enter upon the land reclaimed and assert his
proprietorship :" See City of St. Louis v. Ruts, 138 U. S.
226.

TELRGRAMS.

In North Carolina among others the following rights of
action do not survive: "Causes of action for false imprisonRgfit of ment, assault and battery, or other injury to the
Action,
person, where such injury does not cause the
Survival
death of the injured party." The fact that this
provision has its counterpart in the legislation of most of
the states renders the decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina 'in Morton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 41
S. E. 484, of more than local interest. It is there held
actions for injury to the person include an action against
a telegraph company to recover for mental anguish caused
by its delay in delivering a telegr-am.

USURY.

Against the dissent of three judge§ the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky holds in Blakeley v. Adams, 68 S. W. 473,
Payment
that in an action on a note executed by the
by Surety obligor to reimburse the payee for money paid
as the obligor's surety the obligor is not estopped to plead
that the debt paid by the surety embraced usury, and to
resist a recovery to that extent, unless it is made to appear
that he stood by and permitted the surety to pay the debt
in ignorance of the fact that it embraced usury.
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WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

The fact that the waters of a water course find their source
in springs situated on land owned by a person, does not justify him in erecting a dam on his land by which
Riparian
Owners
the water is spread out, and in consequei.ce of
evaporation less than formerly flows to the riparian proprietors below: Supreme Court of California in Barneich
v. Mercy, 68 Pac. 589. The property rights of such land
owner, it is held, are lost after the water has passed into the
water course. See,, upon the subject, Eddy v. Simpson,
3 Cal. 253.
The difference in the rules of law governing underground
water which flows in a defined channel and such as does not
Underground is well settled. In Board of Supervisors of
Clarke County v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 31
Channels,
Southern, 905, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
Evidence
holds that underground waters are presumed to be percolating, and therefore, in order to enable one to maintain
rights in them such as he would have in a surface stream,
it must be shown that they flow in a well-defined and distinct
underground channel, the existence of which is known or
easily ascertainable: See the note to Wheelock v. Jacobs
(Vt.) 43 L. R. A. 105.

WAYS.

The right to a way of necessity over the lands of a
grantor existing in favor of the grantee, because the land
granted is surrounded partially by the land of
Way by
Necessity
the grantor and elsewhere by the land of strangers, is not affected by a contract of sale of part of the
surrounding lands of the grantor, made prior to the conveyance to the grantee, and of which he had no notice: Supreme
Court of Iowa in Fairchildv. Stewart,-89 N. W. 1075.

WILIS.

Whether it is possible to give a person a fee simple interest
in land and at the same time limit it over upon his death in
Restraints on case he does not alienate or will it, is a question
Alienation
of some doubt. It arose in Kelley v. Hogan,
5, where the New York Supreme Court
Supp.
Y.
76 N.
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(Appellate Division,'- First Department) holds, with one
judge dissenting, thai it may not be done on the ground that
the limitation over Was repugnant to the former provision,
and was void as an attempt to limit the estate after a
previous disposition thereof.
The question of how long alienation may be prevented ,
comes before the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Wallace
v. Smith, 68 S. W. 131, where it is held that a provision
of a will that land devised to an infant shall not be sold until
he is thirty-five years old is an absolute condition of the
devise, and not a mere request or suggestion, and not being
an unreasonable restraint of alienation, is valid. In Gray,
Restr. Alien. Prop. § 5z, it is said: "The actual state of the
law in the United States is as follows: It has often been
said that a condition against alienation confined to a limited
period is good, but such remarks have been obiter dicta without any reasoning or citation of authorities." It is further
said: "The weight of authority, and especially of reasoned
authority, is against the validity of restraints upon alienation, however limited in time." The court however in the
present case refused to adopt Professor Gray's view, and the
decision is as above stated.
In Simpson v. Millsops, 31 Southern, 912, the Supreme

Court of Mississippi holds that where a will directed that
the income of the corpus of the estate should be
income,
Stock
paid to certain beneficiaries for life, increase in
3ramings
the value of stock owing to the earnings of the
corporation after the testator's death having been withheld
by the corporation and carried to the surplus, instead of
distributed as dividends, was income and belonged to the
life beneficiaries. The argument of counsel for appellants,
in whose favor the decision of the court is rendered, is an
elaborate and exhaustive review of the authorities on the
subject, the court saying: "The authorities on all phases
of this question are presented and discussed with absolute
fairness and much ability in the written argument of solicitors for appellants."

